On the night of July 11, 1943, Allied forces unleashed a devastating barrage of antiaircraft fire on their own aircraft during Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. The catastrophic friendly fire incident killed over 300 American soldiers and exposed critical failures in coordination between air planners, naval commanders, and ground forces that would reshape Allied airborne operations for the remainder of World War II.
The Warning That Never Reached the Fleet
At 8:45 a.m. on July 11, General George S. Patton issued explicit orders to all ground and naval units: "take every necessary precaution to prevent firing of any description on low-flying planes (C-47's) which are to arrive over your area between the hours of 2300 and 0030." Despite this clear directive, many sailors aboard Allied vessels later claimed they never received the warning about incoming friendly aircraft.
The communication breakdown proved fatal. Naval crews had endured relentless German bomber attacks throughout the day and were already on edge, their nerves frayed from constant battle. When 144 C-47s and C-53s carrying approximately 2,000 paratroopers from Colonel Reuben Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment approached the coastline near Gela, they flew directly into a perfect storm of miscommunication and raw nerves.
Green Crews Under Fire
The Allied invasion force was heavily populated with inexperienced personnel. Many of the naval gunners had never faced sustained aerial attack, and their training had emphasized aggressive response to any aircraft approaching the fleet at night. Ground-based antiaircraft crews were similarly inexperienced, having been rushed into combat after hasty training in North African camps.
When a lone gun opened fire at the approaching transports, the single shot acted "immediately, as though a prearranged signal," according to official reports. Ships and shore batteries unleashed what witnesses described as "a devastating torrent of antiaircraft fire." The entire coastline erupted in flames as green crews, trained to shoot first and identify later, poured fire into the night sky.
Catastrophic Coordination Failures
Air planners had failed to establish adequate safety corridors for the drop zones. Investigators later determined that safe corridors needed to be at least 10 miles wide, far wider than the inadequate two-mile corridor used during the Sicily operation. The flight path took American transports directly over nervous Allied naval units who had not been properly briefed on the mission timing.
Captain Adam A. Komosa, a paratrooper inside one of the C-47s, watched in horror as "the whole coastline burst into flames." Several C-47s crashed with paratroopers still trapped inside, including one carrying Brigadier General Charles L. Keerans Jr., the 82nd Airborne's assistant division commander. Another transport carrying Lieutenant Colonel Leslie G. Freeman ditched 500 yards offshore, where navy gunners continued raking it with machine gun fire, killing or wounding 11 paratroopers and crewmen.
The aircraft that survived suffered catastrophic damage. Colonel Tucker's plane returned to base riddled with more than 1,000 bullet holes. Several pilots reported being pursued by friendly fire for 30 miles after leaving Sicilian airspace entirely. Eight pilots, recognizing the suicidal nature of dropping men into concentrated fire, refused to release their paratroopers and returned to Tunisia.
The Grim Toll
Twenty-three planes were destroyed and 37 heavily damaged. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment suffered 81 dead, 132 wounded, and 16 missing. The 52nd Troop Carrier Wing lost seven pilots and crewmen killed, 30 wounded, and 53 missing. Combined casualties exceeded 300 men in what became America's second most costly friendly fire incident of the entire war.
Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower was furious, writing that "the incident could have been occasioned only by inexcusable carelessness and negligence on the part of someone." He demanded immediate investigation and disciplinary action.
The Sicily disaster fundamentally transformed Allied airborne doctrine. General Omar Bradley concluded that the safest approach was to avoid passing over friendly fleets entirely, while investigators mandated that naval and ground units be strictly prohibited from firing at any aircraft during designated airborne operations.
This account is reconstructed from official after-action reports, declassified military correspondence, and eyewitness testimonies compiled by the author's research team.

















